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Realism and Reasonableness in Statutory
Interpretation: People v. Anderson
by
GINA LIMANDRI*
The California Supreme Court decision in People v. Anderson I will
gravely impact the rights of criminal defendants prosecuted for felony
murder.2 Upon reconsidering an earlier interpretation of the California
death penalty initiative,3 the Anderson court ruled that intent to kill was
not a prerequisite for the imposition of capital punishment after a convic-
tion of first degree felony murder.
4
While Anderson is important for its effect on California death pen-
alty law, its greater significance lies in the court's new approach to statu-
tory interpretation. In reconsidering a prior interpretation of the death
penalty statute, the court departed from the traditional method of statu-
tory interpretation, which requires the court to focus only on the statu-
tory language itself and on the historical context in which it was passed.
Instead, the Anderson court viewed the statute from a "realistic" perspec-
tive,5 and considered material that is traditionally outside the scope of
statutory interpretation. By using a realistic standard, the court reached
the opposite conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the death pen-
alty statute than that reached by the court four years earlier.
Several problems may result from the unlimited use of a realistic
method of statutory interpretation by courts. The use of the realistic
standard may upset the distribution of power between the legislature and
the judiciary by giving a court too much discretion to determine current
* B.A. 1986, University of California, San Diego; Member, Third Year Class.
1. 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
2. The felony murder doctrine holds a felon strictly liable for all deaths, intentional or
accidental, that occur during the commission of a dangerous felony. See, ag., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988) (Murder committed while defendant was engaged in, or was
an accomplice in, the commission of a felony is a special circumstance, the penalty for which
includes the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole.).
3. Id. §§ 190-190.9.
4. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1145, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
5. Id.; see infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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social, political, and legal attitudes. The standard also may undermine
uniformity and certainty in the administration of criminal justice because
the realistic standard is inherently flexible and subjective. Furthermore,
the Anderson standard may create arbitrary distinctions between crimi-
nal defendants. In order to curb the negative effects of the realistic
method of statutory interpretation, this Note proposes five conditions
that should be met prior to use of this model.
Section I outlines the traditional method of statutory interpretation.
This section first discusses the underlying principles of statutory interpre-
tation, and examines the traditional rules used by the courts. It then
demonstrates that the California courts consistently have followed the
traditional method of statutory interpretation, and analyzes the applica-
tion of this method in Carlos v. Superior Court. 6 In Carlos the California
Supreme Court promulgated the prevailing interpretation of the death
penalty statute which later was reversed in Anderson.
Section II examines People v. Anderson and focuses on the method
of interpretation used by the majority of the court. A discussion of the
dissenting opinion reveals how the majority departed from the traditional
rules of statutory interpretation. Section III analyzes the realistic stan-
dard used by the Anderson court, and explores the negative implications
of the court's new approach to statutory interpretation. Finally, section
IV suggests a set of conditions that should be met before a court may use
the Anderson model to interpret penal statutes.
I. The Traditional Method of Statutory Interpretation
A. The Principles of Statutory Interpretation
The traditional rules of statutory interpretation7 developed as a
loose body of legal guidelines8 designed to help a judge ascertain the
meaning of statutory language. 9 Several principles underlie these rules.
6. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
7. Technically, interpretation and construction are distinguishable.
A rule of construction is one which either governs the effect of an ascertained inten-
tion, or points out what the court should do in the absence of express or implied
intention, while a rule of interpretation is one which governs the ascertainment of the
meaning of the maker of the instrument .... These two terms are, however, com-
monly used interchangeably.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 734 (5th ed. 1979); accord 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (4th rev. ed. 1984).
8. While this Note does not discuss the history of statutory interpretation, a lengthy and
detailed account of this history can be found in Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:
A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985).
9. The rules of interpretation guide the judge's inquiry into the meaning of the language
when the statute was passed. "To interpret is to discover meaning and significance. It does
not concern the meaning and significance of what some person intends to say, but of what is
actually said." Kohler, Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law, in THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL
[Vol. 40
The most fundamental principle is the maintenance of the proper distri-
bution of power between the legislature and the courts. The power of the
courts is limited to the interpretation of a statute, and the courts "should
recognize that the legislature is supreme and must be followed.... The
courts should be controlled by these principles of power distribution and
seek to perpetuate them."10 In short, the courts should avoid judicial
legislation as much as possible.1 The rules of interpretation are designed
to guide the judge in interpreting, not making the law, thereby ensuring
that the judiciary plays its proper role. 12
A second principle underlying the traditional rules of statutory in-
terpretation is based upon an economic theory of legislation. This theory
postulates that statutes are essentially public contracts, which are made
between interest groups and the legislature.13 Because the ordinary
method of enforcement in the private market-legal sanctions-is not
available to enforce public contracts or statutes, "the role of the in-
dependent judiciary is to assure interest groups that their statutory bar-
gains will be fulfflled."' 4 The traditional rules of interpretation, by
focusing on the original intent of the statute, facilitate the practice of
interest group politics and promote stability in the legislative arena.15
Thus, the judiciary becomes the "efficient enforcement mechanism for
legislative deals."'
16
A third principle underlying the rules is the promotion of certainty
and uniformity in the interpretation of statutes. 17 The traditional rules of
statutory interpretation provide a specific method that judges consist-
ently should apply when resolution of a case requires statutory interpre-
tation. This method helps ensure that the interpretive approach will be
similar in each case, thereby promoting the equitable and uniform ad-
ministration of justice. In addition, the rules inhibit a judge from making
METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 187 (1969); see also Johnstone, An Evalua-
tion of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1954), reprinted in 3 J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 817, 817 (4th rev. ed. 1986)
("The ostensible purpose of every rule is to clarify statutory meaning.").
10. Johnstone, supra note 9, at 821.
11. But see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 314-54 (1986); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1480 (1987); Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 395, 399-400 (1950). "
12. Professor Johnstone asserts that the judiciary should defer to the limitations imposed
by the separation of powers doctrine and that the courts "should recognize that the legislature
has become the most important lawmaker on major policy questions." Johnstone, supra note
9, at 822.
13. See Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18
J.L. & ECoN. 875, 877-79 (1975).
14. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1511.
15. See id. at 1511-12.
16. Id. at 1511.
17. Johnstone, supra note 9, at 822.
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arbitrary and purely discretionary decisions18 because the judge must jus-
tify the reasoning underlying an interpretation in accordance with the
rules. 19
B. The Traditional Rules of Statutory Interpretation
The principles of statutory interpretation are embodied in a set of
rules that provide for a multilevel inquiry. The primary rule of statutory
construction under the traditional model states that if a statute is "clear
and unambiguous on its face," the courts must not engage in statutory
interpretation.20 This rule requires judges to construe the "words and
grammar in the light of ordinary meanings and of the relationship of the
statutory provisions within the statute as a whole."' 21 From this proposi-
tion, it follows that courts may interpret only statutes that are reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation and are therefore of doubtful
meaning.
22
If it is established that a statutory ambiguity exists, 23 the next inter-
pretive step is to ascertain the legislative intent at the time the statute was
18. A basic objective of the rules of statutory interpretation is the creation of certainty in
the law, which "prevents the unbridled discretion of the judiciary." Id. The traditional rules
of statutory interpretation promote certainty because the judge must base her decision upon a
standardized set of guidelines. The rules aid the judge in both the process and the articulation
of her reasoning. "Courts should fairly and accurately present the real reasons for their deci-
sions. This makes their opinions more useful as precedent, gives a better basis for healthy and
effective criticism, and increases the likelihood that the courts will carefully think through
their decisions." Id. at 823.
19. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, § 45.02.
20. Id.
The meaning of the language in a particular statute may not always be self-evident be-
cause the words themselves have no inherent meaning. One article illustrated this point. A
sign read "DO NOT GHOTI OFF BRIDGE." The author demonstrated that, if the "GH"
was pronounced as in the word "enough," the "0" as in "women," and the "TI" as in "initi-
ate," it becomes "apparent that the sign proscribes an activity commonly pursued with a rod
and reel." Colton, The Use of Canons of Statutory Construction: A Case Study from Iowa or
When Does "GHOTI" Spell "FISH"?, 5 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 149 n. 1 (1982).
21. Tate, The Judge's Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.U.L.
REV. 147, 152 (1981).
22. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, § 45.02.
23. Most commentators are unwilling to stop at the language of the statute itself. An
otherwise clear and unambiguous statute may become ambiguous in light of its application to
an unforeseen factual context. See Tate, supra note 21, at 152. Professor Levi stated that "[i]t
is only folklore which holds that a statute if clearly written can be completely unambiguous
and applied as intended to a specific case." Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U.
CHI. L. REV. 501, 505 (1948). When a court does assert that a statute is clear and unambigu-
ous and therefore requires no interpretation, in reality, it reflects one of two situations: the
statute already has been construed by the court on an earlier occasion, or the judge is interpret-
ing the statute based upon his "own uninstructed and unrationalized impression" of its proper
meaning. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, § 45.02.
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passed.24 The resource materials used for this task commonly are classi-
fied into two distinct categories: "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" aids.
Extrinsic aids, which consist of background information concerning
the text of the statute, are used widely as the first step in inquiring about
legislative intent.25 The legislative history26 usually is the most illumi-
nating tool in ascertaining intent, but committee reports, 27 floor debate, 28
and repealed statutes29 often are useful as well. All of these aids guide
the judge in ascertaining the legislature's intent at the time the statute was
passed, 30 and do not inquire into the subsequent history or public accept-
ance of the law.
31
Intrinsic aids, or "canons of construction, '32 also are used to ascer-
tain legislative intent.33 Intrinsic aids "derive [a statute's] meaning from
the internal structure of the text and conventional or dictionary mean-
ings of the terms used in it.' '34 They are not positive rules of law but
24. J. HuRsT, DEALING WITH STATUTEs 32 (1982); see also J. SUTHERLAND, supra note
7, § 45.05 ("An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions considering statutory issues are
written in the context of legislative intent. The reason for this lies in an assumption that an
obligation to construe statutes so that they carry out the will, real or attributed, of the lawmak-
ing branch of the government is mandated by principles of separation of powers."). But see
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) ("[Ihe intention of the
legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense .... The chances that of several hundred men
each will have exactly the same... situations in mind [are]... infinitesimally small."); id at
885 (The traditional techniques of statutory interpretation lead to arbitrary and irrational re-
sults and should be abandoned in favor of a system based on a calculus of the probable conse-
quences of alternate interpretations).
25. For an extensive listing of the various types of extrinsic aids, see Johnstone, supra
note 9, at 818.
26. Materials relating to legislative history and intent largely remain unpublished at the
state level. For an excellent research tool and source of legislative intent in California, see
Review of Selected California Legislation, PAC. L.J. (published annually). See also White,
Sources of Legislative Intent in California, 3 PAC. L.J. 63 (1972) (guide to locating the material
and establishing legislative intent).
27. 3. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, §§ 48.06-.08.
28. Lane, Legislative Process and Its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrast, 48 U.
Pri. L. REV. 639, 652 (1987).
29. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, § 51.04.
30. Timing proved to be a key element in the comparison between the traditional meth-
odology of statutory interpretation and the method used by the Anderson court. Because the
Anderson court looked to current realities to ascertain legislative intent, the court was able to
overrule recent precedent interpreting the same statute. See infra notes 75-96 and accompany-
ing text.
31. "Inalterably excluded from any list of potentially reliable items of legislative history
are post-enactment statements of any character. These statements are never the object of legis-
lative attention and are always tempered by the political context that evolves subsequent to the
time in which the dispute over the statute arose." Lane, supra note 28, at 658.
32. The terms "canons of construction" and "rules of construction" denote the same
concept, and are used interchangeably in this Note.
33. See J. HUs-T, supra note 24, at 56-57.
34. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, § 45.14.
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provide "suggestions leading up to the probable meaning where it has
been carelessly or inartificially expressed."' 35 They are "axioms of experi-
ence,"'3 6 and more accurately describe the manner in which the judge
reaches a conclusion than a prescribed method of reasoning.
37
The canons of construction have developed into a vast body of law,
and, despite academic criticisms, 38 are used widely in the courts. 39 Be-
cause the canons are often utilized as guidelines in ascertaining legislative
intent, the "courts do not feel themselves at liberty to disregard the rules
which may be applicable to the given case, unless for very special
reasons."4°
In sum, the traditional method of statutory interpretation consists of
two basic steps. First, the judge must determine whether the language of
the statute is clear and unambiguous. If so, the court must not engage in
statutory interpretation. If an ambiguity exists, however, the court
should attempt to ascertain the intent of the legislature, using both ex-
trinsic and intrinsic aids.
C. Statutory Interpretation in California
Over the years, California courts generally have adhered to the
traditional method of statutory interpretation. First, the courts have
looked to the language of a statute to determine if it was ambiguous.
41 If
an ambiguity existed, the courts then have attempted to ascertain the
intent of the legislature, 42 using both extrinsic43 and intrinsic44 aids. Car-
35. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAWS 7 (1896); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
36. F. FRANKFURTER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES 27 (1947).
37. See Tate, supra note 21, at 152 n.2.
38. Intrinsic aids recently have been the subject of much debate. "It has been fashionable
in recent years to belittle the worth of the rules and canons pertaining to the use of intrinsic
aids." J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, § 45.14 (emphasis added); accord R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 227 (1975). For example, Professor
Llewellyn criticized the efficacy of the canons, asserting that "there are two opposing canons
on almost every point." Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 401. He illustrated this point by listing
28 canons of construction matched by an equal number of canons that were contradictory. Id.
at 401-06.
39. "The appellate courts of all the states have used substantially all of these rules at one
time or another." Johnstone, supra note 9, at 817.
40. H. BLACK, supra note 35, at 7.
41. See, e.g., Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 46 Cal. 3d 736,
741, 759 P.2d 504, 507, 250 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872 (1988); Committee of Seven Thousand v.
Superior Court, 45 Cal. 3d 491, 501, 754 P.2d 708, 713, 247 Cal. Rptr. 362, 367 (1988); People
v. Overstreet, 42 Cal. 3d 891, 895, 726 P.2d 1288, 1289, 231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 214 (1986); Sol-
berg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182, 198, 561 P.2d 1148, 1158, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 470
(1977); In re Marriage of Chapman, 205 Cal. App. 3d 253, 258-59, 252 Cal. Rptr. 359, 362
(1988); County of Fresno v. Clovis Unified School Dist., 204 Cal. App. 3d 417, 426-27, 251
Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n, 46 Cal. 3d at 741, 759 P.2d at 507, 250
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los v. Superior Court45 provides an example of the California Supreme
Court's application of traditional statutory interpretation.
In Carlos, the defendant was charged with murder during the com-
mission of a robbery, or felony murder, which is categorized as a special
circumstance and, thus, is punishable by death under the death penalty
statute.a 6 Although Carlos was a participant in the robbery, he was not
present during the gun battle that resulted in the death of a bystander.4 7
The defendant petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of pro-
hibition to bar his trial on the felony murder special circumstance be-
cause the evidence failed to show he intended to kill or aid in a killing.
The court issued the writ,4 8 and examined the statute to determine its
applicability to the defendant. The court, in an opinion by Justice Brous-
sard, held that proof of intent to kill or to aid in a killing was required of
both a principal and an accomplice charged with the felony murder spe-
cial circumstance, and therefore the death penalty statute was not appli-
cable to Carlos.4
9
The court began its analysis by examining the text of the 1978 death
penalty statute.50 The statute provides that:
Cal. Rptr. at 872; People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1007, 741 P.2d 154, 156, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 656, 658 (1987); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889, 694 P.2d 744, 754, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631, 641 (1985); Sand v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 567, 570, 668 P.2d 787, 789, 194 Cal. Rptr.
480, 482 (1983); People ex reL Younger v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 40, 544 P.2d 1322,
1328, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 128 (1976); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1983) ("In the
construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature... is to be pursued, if possible....").
43. See, e.g., Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n, 46 Cal. 3d at 743, 759 P.2d at 508, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 873 (legislative history and statutory context); People v. Jeffers, 43 Cal. 3d 984,
993, 741 P.2d 1127, 1132, 239 Cal. Rptr. 886, 891 (1987) (history of statute and historical
circumstances of its enactment); People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 266, 710 P.2d 861, 872,
221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 805 (1985) (use of ballot pamphlet); Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 888, 694 P.2d
at 753, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (same).
44. See, eg., Davenport, 41 Cal: 3d at 264, 710 P.2d at 870, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 794 (statute
construed as constitutional if possible); People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 848, 705 P.2d 380,
387, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57, 63 (1985) (construe criminal statute in favor of defendant); People v.
Davis, 29 Cal. 3d 814, 828-29, 633 P.2d 186, 193-94, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521, 528-29 (1981) (con-
strue ambiguous statute in favor of defendant; do not read statute literally if this would bring
result inconsistent with intent of legislature); Tos v. Mayfair Packing Co., 160 Cal. App. 3d 67,
79, 206 Cal. Rptr. 459, 466-67 (1984) (adopt narrowest construction of criminal statute's pen-
alty clause).
45. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988) authorizes the imposition of capital punish-
ment if special circumstances are alleged and found to be true. Felony murder, including
murder committed during the perpetration of a robbery, is a special circumstance permitting
the penalty of death. Id § 190.2(a)(17)(i).
47. Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d at 137, 672 P.2d at 866, 197 Cal. Rptr. at'83.
48. Id. at 136, 672 P.2d at 865, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
49. Id. at 153-54, 672 P.2d at 877, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 95. Justice Broussard was joined by
five Justices: Chief Justice Bird, and Justices Mosk, Kaus, Reynoso, and Karesh. Only Justice
Richardson dissented.
50. The California death penalty initiative was approved by the voters on November 7,
April 1989)
The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree
shall be death ... in any case in which one or more of the following
special circumstances has been charged and specifically found.., to be
true: .. .(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted com-
mission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to
commit the following felonies .... 51
The court concluded that the statutory language was ambiguous on its
face and required interpretation.52 The court then proceeded to the next
step: ascertaining the intent of the legislature. To do this, the court em-
ployed both extrinsic and intrinsic aids.
The court first turned to extrinsic aids. Because the statute was
passed by initiative (Proposition 7), the court sought to ascertain the in-
tent of the framers and the electorate (rather than the legislature). The
voter pamphlet53 and the ballot arguments 54 were used as the court's
primary extrinsic aids. In the Argument Against Proposition 7, the oppo-
nents argued that "[u]nder Proposition 7, a man or a woman could be
sentenced to die for lending another person a screwdriver to use in a
burglary, if the other person accidentally killed someone during the bur-
glary ... [even if the man or woman] had no intention that anyone be
1978. The measure was introduced to the people in Proposition 7, and proposed to do three
things. First, the proposition increased the penalties for first and second degree murder. Sec-
ond, the initiative expanded the list of special circumstances, which if found on the particular
facts would result in a sentence of either death or life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. Third, the proposition revised the existing law concerning mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Analysis by Legislative Analyst, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GEN-
ERAL ELECTION 32 (1978) [hereinafter BALLOT PAMPHLET].
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988).
52. The court determined that the statute was ambiguous for two reasons: (1) the ex-
panded list of felonies in § 190.2 no longer corresponded to felonies listed in the general felony
murder provision, Id. § 189, thereby leading to anomalous results; and (2) the language used in
§ 190.2(b), the accomplice liability provision, was inherently ambiguous when read in conjunc-
tion with subdivision (a)(17), the felony murder provision. Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d at 140-42, 672
P.2d at 868-69, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 85-87.
53. "[T]he California courts have often referred to the analysis and arguments in the
voters' pamphlet as an aid to ascertaining the intention of the framers and the electorate."
Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d at 143, 672 P.2d at 870, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (citing Carter v. Commission
on Qualifications of Judicial Appointments, 14 Cal. 2d 179, 185, 93 P.2d 140, 144 (1939));
accord In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 888 n.8, 694 P.2d 744, 753 n.8, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 640
n.8 (1985).
54. The court stated that the analysis by the Legislative Analyst "merely reiterates an
abridged version of the initiative, and extends no assistance as to the meaning of any ambigu-
ous terms. The argument advanced by the proponents, however, offers some clues." Carlos,
35 Cal. 3d at 143, 672 P.2d at 870, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
The court noted, however, that "[o]ne difficulty with relying on ballot arguments is that
they are stronger on political rhetoric than on legal analysis." Id. at 143 n.11, 672 P.2d at 870
n.ll, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 87 n.ll.
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killed."'5 5 In response to this argument, the proponents instructed the
voters to turn back and read section (b), which "says that the person
must have INTENTIONALLY aided in the commission of a murder to
be subject to the death penalty under this initiative."'56 The court found
that subdivision (b) expressly contained an intent requirement, and that
the voter, when turning back to read subdivision (b) for clarification,
would find that it applied to every person, including the "actual killer."
57
Thus, the court found that the "history of the initiative, as well as its
wording, supported a construction limiting the felony murder special cir-
cumstances to persons who intend to kill or aid in a killing.
'" 58
Next, the court turned to intrinsic aids to determine whether this
construction should govern. At this stage of the analysis, the court ap-
plied a fundamental rule used to construe penal statutes in California:
"'the [criminal] defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable
doubt'" in the interpretation of a statute.5 9 The court emphasized the
particular importance of this rule of construction in felony murder
cases,6° and concluded that "the statute does not permit punishment of
an unintentional felony murder by death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. ' 61
55. Singer, Colley & Brown, Argument Against Proposition 7, in BALLOT PAMPHLET,
supra note 50, at 35.
56. Briggs, Heller & Lowe, Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 7, in BALLOT PAM-
PHLET, supra note 50, at 35 (emphasis in original).
57. Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d at 144-45, 672 P.2d at 871, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
58. Id. at 145, 672 P.2d at 871, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (emphasis added).
59. Id. (quoting Exparte Rosenheim, 83 Cal. 388, 391, 23 P. 372, 373 (1890)) (emphasis
added). The rule in its entirety reads:
While it is true [that] the rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed has been abrogated by the code, which provides that "all its provisions are
to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its
object and promote justice," it is also true that the defendant is entitled to the benefit
of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise[s] out of a question of fact, or as to the
true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute ....
Rosenheim, 83 Cal. at 391, 23 P. at 373 (1890) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (current version
at West 1988)).
60. Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d at 146, 672 P.2d at 872, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
61. Id. at 147, 672 P.2d at 872-73, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
The court relied upon ari additional rule of construction: "when faced with an ambiguous
statute that raises serious constitutional questions, [a court] should endeavor to construe [the]
statute in a manner which avoids any doubt concerning its validity." Id., 672 P.2d at 873, 197
Cal. Rptr. at 90 (emphasis in original). This Note will not address the constitutionality issue
in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987). In Tison, 481 U.S. at 138, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, ruled that the
eighth amendment did not prohibit the imposition of capital punishment as disproportionate
to the crime for an accomplice in a felony murder if: (1) defendant's participation in the felony
was major; and (2) defendant's mental state was one of reckless indifference. Because the
absence of an intent requirement was constitutionally permissible for an accomplice, it follows
that the actual killer need not have intent either. Although much of the reasoning of Tison
April 19891
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II. People v. Anderson
The Carlos holding and the court's use of the traditional method of
statutory interpretation were abandoned by the California Supreme
Court in People v. Anderson.62 Using a "realistic" method of statutory
interpretation, the Anderson court held that intent to kill is not an ele-
ment of the felony murder special circumstance as applied to the actual
murderer.63 While the result in Anderson was undoubtedly a product of
the change in composition of the California Supreme Court in the inter-
vening four years, 64 the new method of statutory interpretation used to
reach the court's result marks a dangerous departure from past
precedent.
A. The Facts of Anderson
On March 4, 1979, James Anderson was riding in a car with his
girlfriend, Sheila Anders, and her brother, Fred Anders. Fred, who was
driving, pulled the car over when he saw two women stranded on the side
of the road.65 One of the women, Donna Coselman, accepted their offer
of help and got into their car while her grandmother remained with the
disabled vehicle. Donna was driven to an orange grove, where she later
was found with a rope around her neck, dead from strangulation.66
Sheila and Anderson were found near the grove that night and arrested.
The grandmother's watch and purse were found on Sheila, and Sheila's
purse contained Donna's wallet.67 The next day, the police found the
grandmother's body hanging from a tree in the grove with a rope around
her neck. 6
8
Although there were conflicting versions of the facts,69 the defend-
ant Anderson and Sheila Anders each were charged with two counts of
murder. The prosecution alleged two special circumstances: multiple
appeared to be rejected in the subsequent case of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987),
Tison presently is the law and therefore renders a discussion of constitutional issues moot.
62. 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
63. Id. at 1142, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 609. The court also held that the
prosecutor must prove intent to kill if the defendant is an aider or abettor. Id. at 1147, 742
P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 611. Thus, a court must instruct the jury that intent to kill is
an element of felony murder special circumstance if there is evidence from which a jury could
find that the defendant was an accomplice and not the actual killer.
64. In 1986, Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird and Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz
Reynoso lost their seats on the California Supreme Court as a result of a judicial election on
November 5. See Bottorff, Lucas Considered a Likely Choice as Next Chief Justice: Governor
to Remold Court After Rejection of Bird Colleagues, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 6, 1986, at 1, col. 6.




69. The defendant and Fred Anders offered different versions about the events of that
night. Fred, who had notified the police initially, testified for the prosecution against Ander-
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murder70 and felony murder during the course of a robbery. 71 At trial,
Sheila presented a diminished capacity defense and was convicted of sec-
ond degree murder.72 James Anderson was convicted of first degree
murder, and both special circumstances were found to exist. The jury
sentenced Anderson to death. 73 Anderson appealed the verdict of guilt
because the trial court did not instruct the jurors on intent to kill in
accordance with Carlos v. Superior Court. 74
B. The Majority Opinion
Interestingly, Justice Mosk, who had joined the majority opinion in
Carlos, wrote for the majority in Anderson.75 Justice Mosk asserted that
the court had a "duty" to reconsider the earlier interpretation of the 1978
death penalty initiative because two United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, 76 subsequent to Carlos, brought one of the bases of the Carlos deci-
sion into question.77 Thus, although the language of the statute and its
historical background remained the same, the Anderson court ignored
these key elements of traditional statutory interpretation and availed it-
self of the opportunity to reconsider Carlos.
The court began its analysis with the first step of traditional statu-
tory interpretation: an examination of the statutory language. The court
asserted that the plain meaning of the words in the felony murder provi-
sion did not require a finding of intent to kill: "If section 190.2(a)(17)
[the felony murder special circumstance] is read alone, it does not require
a finding of intent to kill: the plain language of the provision neither
expressly nor impliedly demands such a finding."
'78
son, and was not charged with any crime. Id. at 1116-17, 742 P.2d at 1310, 240 Cal. Rptr. at
589.
70. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West 1988).
71. See id. § 190.2(a)(17)(i).
72. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1117-18, 742 P.2d at 1311, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
73. Id. at 1118, 742 P.2d at 1311, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
74. Id. at 1138, 742 P.2d at 1325, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
75. The majority opinion was joined by Justices Panelli, Arguelles, and Eagleson. Justice
Lucas wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Kaufman concurred, and dissented on a
separate issue. Justice Broussard concurred in the reversal of the penalty, and dissented as to
the remainder of the opinion.
76. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986). In
his dissent, Justice Broussard asserted that the majority found support for its decision to recon-
sider Carlos from "insignificant dictum" in Cabana, and a "mistaken footnote" in Tison. An-
derson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1155, 742 P.2d at 1336, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
77. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1141, 742 P.2d at 1327, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
78. Id. The text of Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17) reads in relevant part:
The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death
... in any case in which one or more of the following special circumstances has been
charged and specifically found... to be true: ... (17) The murder was committed
while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of,
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Next, the court considered the felony murder special circumstance
in conjunction with section 190.2(b), the provision for accomplice liabil-
ity.79 The majority stated that its "reading of the felony-murder special
circumstance is not undermined but merely modified by the addition of
an exception to the general rule that intent to kill is not required." 80
Even though the felony murder special circumstance was prefaced by
language including both the actual killer and the accomplice, 81 the court
proffered two reasons why section 190.2(b) "must nevertheless be read to
govern the liability of the aider and abettor only." 82 First, the provision
used words that "generally and traditionally describe the involvement"
of an accomplice, not the actual killer.8 3 Second, if the provision were
read to require intent to kill, such requirement would "render superflu-
ous the express intent requirement that some of [the special circum-
stances] already contain."'84
The court then used an extrinsic aid, language from the voter pam-
phlet, to support its position that section 190.2(b), with its intent require-
ment, only governs accomplice liability.8 5 The same ballot arguments
cited in Carlos were quoted in Anderson to support the contrary
position.
86
Accordingly, the court concluded that the felony murder special cir-
cumstance was not ambiguous: "on further reflection we now believe that
[the] premise [that section 190.2(a)(17) was ambiguous] was mistaken:
given a fair reading, section 190.2(a)(17) provides that intent is not an
attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to
commit the following felonies ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West 1988). The list of felonies includes, among others,
kidnapping, robbery, rape, sodomy, burglary, and arson. Id.
79. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1141, 742 P.2d at 1327, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 606. Subdivision
(b) reads:
Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of intentionally aiding,
abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, soliciting, requesting, or assisting any
actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or confine-
ment in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b).
80. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1142, 742 P.2d at 1327, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
81. See supra note 79.




85. The court cited the legislative analysis section of the voter pamphlet, stating that it
"clearly implies that section 190.2(b) governs the liability of the aider and abettor and provides
that the aider and abettor is death-eligible if he is proved to have acted with the intent to kill."
Id. at 1143, 742 P.2d at 1328, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (citing Analysis by Legislative Analyst, in
BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 50, at 32).
86. Id. This is significant because the ballot argument apparently can support two rea-
sonable, albeit contrary, interpretations. For the text of the argument, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 55-56. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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element of the felony-murder special circumstance. ' 8 7 Furthermore,
when the felony murder provision was "given a fair reading in conjunc-
tion with section 190.2(b), the provision can realistically be read only to
require intent to kill for the aider and abettor but not for the actual
killer."
88
Under the traditional method of statutory interpretation, once the
court found the statutory language to be unambiguous, the court's analy-
sis of the statute would end. The Anderson majority, however, continued
its discussion of the felony murder special circumstance, stating that
"even if the provision were ambiguous, we now believe that an applica-
tion of the rules of construction we used in Carlos would not change our
reading."8' 9 The court then examined the rule of construction that enti-
tles a defendant to the benefit of every reasonable doubt in the interpreta-
tion of a statute.90 Curiously, the court stated that the "canon entitles
the defendant only to the benefit of every realistic doubt," 91 and dis-
missed the canon as inapplicable because the court "no longer [has] any
realistic doubt as to the meaning... of the felony murder special circum-
stance."' 92 The court did not cite any precedent93 for this change in the
canon's language.94
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the majority overruled Carlos,
and held that intent to kill is not a requirement of the felony murder
87. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1143, 742 P.2d at 1329, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (emphasis
added).
88. Id at 1145, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (emphasis added). In contrast,
the Carlos court sought a reasonable interpretation of the statute. See Carlos v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 143, 672 P.2d 862, 870, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 87 (1983).
89. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1145, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (emphasis
added).
90. See supra text accompanying note 59.
91. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1145, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (emphasis in
original).
92. Id. at 1146, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (emphasis in original).
93. The court did cite several cases after it made this change: United States v. Raynor,
302 U.S. 540 (1938) and People v. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 277 P.2d 393 (1954). The court
cited Hallner and Raynor for the proposition that penal statutes should be interpreted to give a
"fair" import to the statutory language. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1145-46, 742 P.2d at 1330,
240 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10. The cases, however, do not support this substitution of "realistic!'
for "reasonable."
94. The Anderson court discussed a second canon: "'when the constitutionality of a stat-
ute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations,... by one of
which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such ques-
tions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."' Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1146, 742 P.2d at
1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (citing United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
407-08 (1909)). Again, the court changed the word "reasonabl[e]" to "realistic," and empha-
sized the change. See id ("the statute must be realistically susceptible of two interpretations").
Because a discussion of the constitutional issues presented is outside the scope of this Note, see
supra note 61, the court's application of this canon will not be discussed.
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special circumstance. 95 Specific intent must be proved only when the de-
fendant is an accomplice and not the actual killer.96 This analysis, how-
ever, prompted a scathing dissent by Justice Broussard.
C. The Anderson Dissent
Justice Broussard wrote a harshly critical dissent from the major-
ity's discussion of the felony murder special circumstance. His criticism
of the majority's decision to overrule the Carlos interpretation of the
1978 death penalty initiative focused upon two points: (1) the majority's
disregard of the principle of stare decisis; and (2) the majority's depar-
ture from the accepted principles of statutory construction.
(1) Stare Decisis
Justice Broussard began his dissent by extolling the benefits of stare
decisis: "Periodically, when the political winds gust in a new direction, it
becomes necessary to remind all concerned of the virtues of a steady
course. As lawyers and judges, we sometimes deliver our reminder in
Latin: stare decisis. ' ' 97 Justice Broussard saw the majority's decision to
overrule Carlos and its progeny98 as departing from this principle in sev-
eral respects.
First, Justice Broussard asserted that it is "rare for this court to
overrule a recent precedent construing a statute." 99 When the legislature
or, in this case the electorate, disapproves of a court's interpretation of a
particular statute, the situation may be remedied by taking action to
overturn the judicial interpretation. 100 The absence of legislative or initi-
ative action subsequent to the Carlos interpretation suggested to Justice
Broussard that "there is no consensus among either the Legislature or
95. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1147, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 1152, 742 P.2d at 1335, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
98. Thirteen decisions followed the Carlos interpretation of the 1978 death penalty initia-
tive: People v. Ratliff, 41 Cal. 3d 675, 715 P.2d 665, 224 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1986); People v.
Hamilton (Bernard), 41 Cal. 3d 408, 710 P.2d 981, 221 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1985), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. California v. Hamilton, 476 U.S. 1301 (1986); People v. Silbertson, 41 Cal.
3d 296, 709 P.2d 1321, 221 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1985); People v. Fuentes, 40 Cal. 3d 629, 710 P.2d
240, 221 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1985); People v. Guerra, 40 Cal. 3d 377, 708 P.2d 1252, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 374 (1985); People v. Chavez, 39 Cal. 3d 823, 705 P.2d 372, 218 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1985);
People v. Hayes, 38 Cal. 3d 780, 699 P.2d 1259, 214 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1985); People v. Boyd, 38
Cal. 3d 762, 700 P.2d 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985); People v. Anderson (Stephen), 38 Cal. 3d
58, 694 P.2d 1149, 210 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1985); People v. Armendariz, 37 Cal. 3d 573, 693 P.2d
243, 209 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1984); People v. Turner, 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr.
196 (1984); People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984); People
v. Whitt, 36 Cal. 3d 724, 685 P.2d 1161, 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984).
99. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1165, 742 P.2d at 1343, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
100. See id. at 1165, 742 P.2d at 1343-44, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
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the voters that an unintentional murderer should be executed."' 10 1 He
argued that the court should not take such action on its own initiative.
10 2
Second, the intent to kill instruction had been given in all capital
cases after the Carlos decision was rendered in 1983. Since that time,
there were "no complaint[s] that such instructions [had] led to confusion,
inefficiency, or brought about mistaken or unjust verdicts."'
103
Third, the decision to overrule Carlos created an arbitrary distinc-
tion between defendants.' °4 Some criminal defendants tried before the
1983 Carlos decision received an intent to kill instruction. 0 5 Others did
not, and consequently appealed. The unfortunate pre-1983 defendants,
whose appeals had not been resolved prior to the Anderson decision,
would not receive the benefit of the Carlos instruction. Such a distinction
could mean the difference between life or death. 1
0 6
Finally, Justice Broussard asserted that the court should not over-
rule a line of precedent simply because the makeup of the court had
changed. 0 7 "Imagine, for example, the chaos if some years in the future
a newly constituted California Supreme Court, taking its view of stare
decisis from the present decision, were to overrule the present decision
and reinstate Carlos, thus invalidating most death penalty judgments ren-
dered in the interim."' 10 8
(2) Statutory Construction
Justice Broussard's main objection to the majority's approach to the
interpretation of the death penalty statute focused on their substitution of
the word "reasonable" for "realistic" in the canon of statutory construc-
tion that requires penal statutes, reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation, to be interpreted in the defendant's favor. 0 9 The majority
asserted that the 1978 death penalty initiative was "realistically" suscep-
tible of only one meaning, that is, intent to kill was not required for the
actual killer. 10 Justice Broussard asserted, however, that "[a]nyone fa-





105. Some trial judges, anticipating the Carlos decision, gave such an instruction in pre-
Carlos cases. See id.
106. See id. at 1166, 742 P.2d at 1344, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
107. See id at 1153, 742 P.2d at 1335, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 615. Justice Broussard is referring
to the California judicial election of 1986. See supra note 64.
108. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1153 n.4, 742 P.2d at 1335 n.4, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 614 n.4.
109. Id at 1156-57, 742 P.2d at 1334-35, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18; see supra notes 59, 90-
94 and accompanying text.
110. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1145, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
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something is wrong with this assertion-the word 'realistically' does not
belong."11 l
Justice Broussard cited a list of cases to highlight the use of the
word "reasonable" in the canon of construction. None of these cases,
however, used the word "realistic" when applying the canon.1 12 He also
pointed out that the majority did not explain the difference between the
two standards, and indicated that "standing alone, the word ['realistic']
carries ominous overtones of judicial submission to political realities."113
Because the majority did not elucidate the significance of the substi-
tution of "realistic" for "reasonable," Justice Broussard ignored the
change and analyzed the statute from a reasonableness perspective.
114
He found the statute to be ambiguous on its face, and determined that
the felony murder special circumstance had more than one reasonable
interpretation."15 Since more than one reasonable interpretation existed,
according to Justice Broussard, the majority should have followed prece-
dent and chosen the Carlos interpretation.
1 6
Justice Broussard's dissent presented forceful arguments against the
majority's decision to overrule Carlos. This Note now will explore the
possible ominous implications of the Anderson decision suggested in Jus-
tice Broussard's dissent.
III. Implications of the Anderson Realistic Standard of
Statutory Interpretation
A. The Realistic Method
Under the traditional method of statutory interpretation, a judge's
inquiry is limited to the text of the statute and evidence of the historical
context in which the statute was passed. 117 The realistic approach to
statutory interpretation adopted by the Anderson majority, however,
broadens the scope of a court's inquiry. Instead of confining the analysis
of a statute to the context in which it was passed, the realistic standard
permits a court to consider current realities, that is, social, political, and
legal changes and attitudinal shifts since the passage of the statute. A
111. Id. at 1156, 742 P.2d at 1338, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 1157, 742 P.2d at 1338, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (citing People v. Garfield, 40
Cal. 3d 192, 200, 707 P.2d 258, 264, 219 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202 (1985); People v. Davis, 29 Cal.
3d 814, 828, 633 P.2d 186, 193, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521, 528 (1981); People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12,
23, 582 P.2d 1000, 1006, 148 Cal. Rptr. 409, 415 (1978); Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal.
3d 479, 488, 556 P.2d 1081, 1084, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 633 (1976)).
113. Id. at 1157 n.12, 742 P.2d at 1338 n.12, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 617 n.12.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 1158-60, 742 P.2d at 1338-40, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
116. Id. at 1160, 742 P.2d at 1340, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
117. See supra note 20-24 and accompanying text.
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comparison between "reasonableness" and "realism" illustrates this
point.
A reasonableness standard encourages a court to focus on what is
fair and just under the circumstances. 118 In order to be fair and just, the
court must conduct its analysis in a manner as objective as possible. The
court's inquiry is limited to objective facts and materials: the language of
the statute and its legislative history. 119 Perhaps more importantly, by
limiting the court's inquiry to determining the original intent of the legis-
lature, use of the reasonableness standard prevents courts from consider-
ing present societal and political values.
A realistic standard, however, allows more subjectivity and judicial
discretion to enter into the statutory analysis. The focus of the inquiry
no longer is limited to the original intent of the legislature because that
intent, if ascertainable, may not reflect current realities. A realistic stan-
dard permits dynamic statutory interpretation, that is, the court can con-
sider the language of the statute, its historical context, and the "present
societal, political, and legal context." 120
Thus, when interpreting a statute, the court may consider far more
material under a realistic standard than under a reasonableness standard.
The concern is no longer solely with what is reasonable, that is, fair and
just, but also with what currently reflects reality. Dynamic statutory in-
terpretation takes the various socio-political changes of any given time
period into account, and incorporates such changes into the law.
In Anderson, the court acknowledged the changing social and polit-
ical attitudes towards the death penalty. The court's eyes had been
opened by a recent judicial election that substantially altered the makeup
of the California Supreme Court. A bitter campaign had focused primar-
ily upon the court's then restrictive application of the death penalty initi-
ative, and nearly half of the Justices were voted out of office. 121 The
election results suggested that the public disfavored a limited application
of the death penalty statute. Thus, the newly elected court acted consist-
118. "Reasonable" is defined as "fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circum-
stances." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1138 (5th ed. 1979).
119. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. Intrinsic aids are included in the in-
quiry because they aid in the interpretation of the language of the statute. See supra notes 32-
37 and accompanying text.
120. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1479.
121. See Roberts, Special Interests Mainly Financing High Court Races, L.A. Daily J., Oct.
24, 1986, at 1, col. 6 C" 'The death penalty issue is what the public is basing its decision on'"
(quoting Debbie Goff of Crime Victims for Court Reform)); Chance, Public Views Mixed on
Bird, Reynoso, Grodin, L.A. Daily L., Oct. 10, 1986, at 2, col. 4 (nearly half of those who said
they intended to vote against Bird cited her position on the death penalty as their reason); Jost,
Beating an Issue to Death, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 6, 1986, at 2, col. 6 (Governor George
Deukmejian opposed Reynoso, Grodin, and Bird because their votes in death penalty cases
lacked objectivity.); see supra note 64.
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ently with political realities and attitudinal changes, and overruled the
narrow Carlos interpretation of the felony murder special circumstance.
B. The Negative Implications of the Realistic Standard
Unlimited application of the realistic approach to statutory interpre-
tation will cause several problems in the development and administration
of criminal law in California.
(1) The Distribution of Power
The realistic standard threatens to upset the distribution of power
between the legislature and the judiciary by enabling the judiciary to en-
croach upon the lawmaking function of the legislature. The realistic
standard permits the judge to draw upon an enormous body of sources in
her search for a realistic interpretation of a statute. The judge may con-
sider current social and political realities in addition to the text of the
statute and its legislative history. Ultimately, this method gives too
much discretion to the interpreting judge. Realities will vary from per-
son to person, even from day to day. Thus, the judge essentially may
interpret the statute to reach almost any result she desires. In effect, the
judge may make the law, rather than merely interpret it, and in that
sense usurp the role of the legislature.
The dynamic method of statutory interpretation also permits the
legislature and the electorate to exert undue influence on the judiciary.
As in Anderson, political or societal disfavor of a particular policy or
ruling may coerce the court into reaching a particular result or reversing
itself, especially when the judges may be voted out of office. Such pres-
sure encroaches upon the independence of the judiciary, and permits the
legislature and the electorate to exert its influence over the exercise of the
judicial function.
(2) Certainty and Uniformity in the Administration of Criminal Justice
The Anderson approach to statutory interpretation may have a nega-
tive effect on the administration of criminal justice because the realistic
standard is inherently flexible and subjective. Unlimited application of
this standard to penal statutes would render the criminal law uncertain
and impede the uniform administration of the law.
Due process requires that a criminal defendant have fair notice that
his conduct is deemed criminal and what the punishment is for such con-
duct. " 'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be in-
formed as to what the State commands or forbids.' 122 This due process
122. Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633-34, 470 P.2d 617, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481,
490 (1970) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
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requirement ensures that the criminal law is certain and foreseeable, so
that a criminal defendant may be warned that his conduct constitutes a
crime with attendant penalties.
123
This basic due process requirement cannot be met when a law is
constantly subject to new interpretation. For example, in Anderson the
realistic approach to statutory interpretation permitted the unforeseeable
judicial enlargement of the application of the death penalty to uninten-
tional criminal conduct. Although the defendant in Anderson was aware
that his behavior was criminal, he was not given fair notice of the penal-
ties that attached if he were convicted. Moreover, because the Anderson
court did not indicate the limits of the realistic approach, the dynamic
method of statutory interpretation potentially could be used to enlarge
the penalties under almost any penal statute. This use of the realistic
approach would undermine the certainty in the criminal law that is re-
quired by due process.
The potential for unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the penalties
for criminal conduct also could impede the uniform administration of
justice. The law would be in a perpetual state of flux, depending upon
the political and social realities that currently prevailed. As a result,
criminal defendants would receive unequal treatment under the same pe-
nal statute because the application of the statute and its attendant penal-
ties would shift with attitudinal changes. In addition, because the courts
have no guidance about when to apply the dynamic method of statutory
interpretation (if at all) and when to apply the traditional method, con-
flicting interpretations of the same penal law may emerge from different
courts, further undermining the uniform application of the criminal law.
(3) Arbitrary Distinctions Between Criminal Defendants
The Anderson approach also created an arbitrary distinction be-
tween criminal defendants.124 PreCarlos defendants who did not receive
the intent-to-kill instruction and whose appeals were pending at the time
of the Anderson decision would not receive the benefit of the intent in-
struction. Those preCarlos defendants whose appeals happened to be de-
cided prior to Anderson did receive the benefit of the intent instruction.
Such arbitrary distinctions between criminal defendants are undesirable,
especially when the distinction randomly extends the application of the
death penalty statute to include a new group of defendants.
If the Anderson approach is used to interpret all penal statutes in the
future, further arbitrary distinctions between criminal defendants may
result. For example, in five years the socio-political climate could de-
mand that felony murder accomplices who had no intent to kill should be
eligible for the death penalty. Using the dynamic method of statutory
123. See id. at 633, 470 P.2d at 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
124. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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interpretation, the court would be able to overrule Anderson to the extent
that intent to kill was required for accomplices, and enlarge the penalties
for unintentional felony murder accomplices to include the death pen-
alty. Thus, accomplices that were tried prior to this ruling would receive
the benefit of the intent-to-kill instruction, thereby eliminating the possi-
bility of the death penalty. Those accomplices who were tried the day
after the new ruling could be executed for an unintentional murder that
they did not even commit. Although changes in the criminal laws almost
always produce anomalous results, such changes are the province of the
legislature, and not the courts.
IV. Guidelines for the Application of the Anderson Realistic
Standard to Penal Statutes
Although unlimited application of the dynamic method of statutory
interpretation would be detrimental to the criminal justice system, the
method may be useful in situations in which the legislature is unwilling
or unable to respond efficiently to legal issues that demand swift resolu-
tion. Before a court employs this method, however, the following five
conditions should be met:125
(1) The old interpretation of a statute is clearly inconsistent with
current realities;
(2) The current realities reflect well established socio-political at-
titudinal changes, which the court must document by pointing to ob-
jective facts and materials;
(3) There is little or no possibility of legislative reform;
(4) The new interpretation does not expand or retract the applica-
tion of the penal statute any more than is absolutely necessary;
(5) Only the highest court may use the dynamic method of statu-
tory interpretation.
Limiting the use of the dynamic method of statutory interpretation
according to these guidelines will preserve the distribution of power be-
tween the legislature and judiciary because the conditions will restrict the
unbridled discretion of the interpreting judge. Under the first two condi-
tions, the judge must point to objective facts and materials to support his
conclusion that the old interpretation is clearly inconsistent with current
realities. I26 Furthermore, the judiciary may only act when there is little
or no possibility of legislative reform, such as when the legislature refuses
to reform a law despite continued public pressure to do so, or when legis-
125. These conditions loosely parallel Professor Schlesinger's formula for determining
when a German court may apply a judge-made law that violates a statute. See R. SCHLES-
INGER, H. BAADE, M. DAMASKA & P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW: CAsES-TEXT--
MATERIALS 641-42 (5th ed. 1988).
126. Such objective materials could include sociological studies about current attitudinal
changes, or law review or newspaper articles indicating change in the socio-political climate.
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lative debate indicates that lack of consensus would quelch any reform
attempts. The legislature may not exert undue influence over the judici-
ary because a statute may be interpreted dynamically only when all of the
conditions are met.
The guidelines also will promote certainty in criminal law because
there will be notice as to when the realistic standard will be used. More-
over, the guidelines will aid in the uniform administration of justice.
Only the highest state court may utilize the standard, thereby eliminating
the possibility of conflicting statutory interpretations from lower courts.
Additionally, because the court must gather objective facts and materials
to demonstrate current realities, the use of the standard will require the
court to expend additional time and effort, further reducing use of the
standard and the possibility of inconsistency.
Finally, if the courts adhere to these conditions, the use of the An-
derson approach should not create arbitrary distinctions between crimi-
nal defendants. Although distinctions still may exist in Jimited
situations, they will no longer be arbitrary. The court will have to meet a
specific set of criteria before the Anderson standard may be applied. In
all other cases, the traditional method of statutory interpretation should
be used.
Clearly, these conditions had not been met in Anderson. There was
no evidence that the Carlos interpretation requiring an intent to kill in-
struction for felony murderers was inconsistent with current realities.
Although the campaign waged against the former California Supreme
Court justices focused on the issue of the death penalty, 127 the propa-
ganda used to persuade the public not to re-elect the Justices centered on
egregious acts of intentional murder.128 The emotional campaign did not
attempt to persuade the public that the application of the death penalty
statute should be expanded to include unintentional felony murderers.
The Anderson court did not point to any objective facts or materials to
support its conclusion that current socio-political attitudes mandated the
imposition of capital punishment on unintentional felony murderers. In-
deed, the legislature and the electorate had had four years to respond to
the Carlos interpretation of the death penalty statute if they found its
ruling objectionable. As Justice Broussard pointed out in his dissent,
127. See supra note 121.
128. See Chiang, Anti-Bird Group Unveils Campaign Ads, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 8, 1986, at 2,
cols. 2-4. One television commercial showed a woman seated by a picture of a blonde-haired
girl. "My daughter never got to her ballet lesson," the mother says. "But the man who kid-
napped and killed her is still alive. Rose Bird, Cruz Reynoso, and Joseph Grodin overturned
his death sentence as they have for so many other brutal killers." Id; see also Rose Elizabeth
Bird: To Many, a Symbol of Frustration over Crime, Punishment, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 27, 1986,
at 5, col. 1 (bumper sticker spotted in Southern California read "Free the Night Stalker. Elect
Rose Bird.").
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there had been no complaints about the Carlos decision.1 29 Because all of
the proposed conditions were not met in Anderson, and because the Car-
los interpretation was reasonable under traditional statutory interpreta-
tion, the court should have adhered to the principle of stare decisis.
Conclusion
In the landmark decision of People v. Anderson, the California
Supreme Court held that intent to kill was no longer an element of the
felony murder special circumstance for the actual killer. Perhaps the
true significance of the decision, however, lies in the Anderson approach
to statutory interpretation.
To reach the result in Anderson, the court departed from the tradi-
tional method of statutory interpretation. Instead, the court used a dy-
namic method of interpretation by substituting a realistic standard for a
reasonable one. This change in perspective allowed the court to consider
the current social and political climate when interpreting the California
death penalty statute. The consideration of this additional material re-
sulted in the overruling of Carlos, and the elimination of the intent to kill
requirement for imposing the death penalty on felony murderers who
actually kill.
The court's use of a realistic standard when interpreting penal stat-
utes may be detrimental to the criminal justice system. The dynamic
method of statutory interpretation may upset the distribution of power
between the judiciary and the legislature, and may undermine the cer-
tainty and uniformity required by due process. Additionally, the Ander-
son method may create arbitrary distinctions between criminal
defendants.
In order to curb these negative effects, the court should adhere to
specific guidelines before invoking the dynamic method in the criminal
context. Before a court may interpret a penal statute in light of current
realities, it must find that the old interpretation is clearly inconsistent
with current realities by pointing to objective facts and materials. Fur-
ther, the court must show that there is little or no possibility of legislative
reform, and that the new interpretation is not overly broad or restrictive.
Finally, even when these conditions are met, only the highest state court
should be allowed to utilize the Anderson method to interpret penal
statutes.
129. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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